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Educating for Justice in a Secular Age: 
Charles Taylor on the Moral Roots of Identity and Belief 
 





More than forty years after the Society of Jesus first articulated an inextricable link between the service of 
faith and the promotion of justice, a growing challenge today for Jesuit colleges and universities is to 
demonstrate what (if anything) faith adds to the struggle for human dignity and rights. Charles Taylor offers 
one of the most expansive views of our secular age, arguing that the cultural shifts are moral in nature. 
Ultimately, our secular age is one in which we are able to imagine human fullness and flourishing with no 
reference to the transcendent. This article employs the moral framework that Taylor develops in Sources of the 
Self as an interpretive lens for A Secular Age and identifies new challenges and opportunities for justice 
education embedded within our contemporary context. Ultimately, sustaining our moral and social 
commitments is difficult (if not impossible) without engaging our deeper moral and spiritual sources. 
 
Introduction 
2015 marked the fortieth anniversary of the 
Society of Jesus’ 32nd General Congregation, 
whose fourth decree articulated the mission today 
in terms of an inextricable link between the 
service of faith and the promotion of justice.1 This 
document amplified a profound shift in the 
mission of Jesuit higher education that began a 
year earlier with Pedro Arrupe’s call for colleges 
and universities that form men (and women) for 
others.2 In the years since, this declaration has 
remained a radical challenge not just for Jesuits 
but also for the institutions sponsored by the 
Society. There have been important developments 
and commentaries in the years since. In particular, 
Peter-Hans Kolvenbach’s demand twenty-five 
years later that the measure of any Jesuit 
institution is who the students become, and he 
called for “a well-educated solidarity…[that] is 
learned through ‘contact’ rather than ‘concepts.’”3  
The radical character of the fourth decree persists, 
but the context has shifted in recent years. 
Undoubtedly, there are still many that hold on to 
privatized or other-worldly notions of faith for 
whom the demands of justice remain (at best) 
secondary concerns. Yet increasingly, 
communicating to our students the necessity of 
working for justice is not our principal challenge; 
it’s helping them to recognize what committed 
faith adds to these labors. As recent Pew studies 
demonstrate, religiously unaffiliated “nones” are 
on the rise and now constitute 36% of college-
aged emerging adults.4 At the same time, they are 
the most politically progressive and tolerant 
generational cohort in the country.5 For many 
students, a commitment to the promotion of 
justice is easy, at least in theory. The question is 
why the service of faith is a necessary corollary.  
Formulating an institutional response to this 
emerging trend begins by properly understanding 
our contemporary context. Few recent texts have 
contributed more to our understanding of this 
new secular milieu than Charles Taylor’s A Secular 
Age.6 Crucially, Taylor shifts the entire inquiry 
from the more readily apparent declines in the 
public influence or private practice of religion, 
examining instead the contemporary conditions of 
belief. How is it, he asks, that whereas non-belief 
was virtually impossible 500 years ago, we have 
come to a point today in which theistic belief is 
recognized as but one of many life options – and 
frequently one of the more difficult? Getting to 
this point was a creative achievement of 
modernity. Secularism is not what is left once 
science had disproved our old mythologies and 
superstitions. Far from a pre-determined or 
inevitable stage in western history, the 
secularization narrative Taylor offers is in his 
words a “zig-zag account…full of unintended 
consequences.”7 Indeed, many of cultural shifts 
that Taylor identifies were Christian in origin. 
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Taylor’s insights (and indeed his framing of the 
entire question) have prompted a flurry of 
responses in the form of conferences, symposia, 
and edited volumes. They also earned the author 
the Templeton Prize in 2007. Not every 
commentator accepts his take on our secular age, 
but his text is necessary reading for anyone who 
wishes to be a part of the ongoing conversation. 
My hope for this essay is not principally to offer a 
synopsis of the historical transitions outlined in A 
Secular Age, however.8 Rather, I wish to highlight 
the ways in which, from Taylor’s perspective, the 
growing commitment to justice and declining rates 
of religious participation find a common source in 
our moral imaginations. I will further argue that if 
Taylor’s read on our contemporary situation is 
correct, opportunities for sustained contact with 
the poor and marginalized through experiential 
education and service-learning programs must be 
a central to Jesuit higher education’s ongoing 
commitment to the indissoluble link between 
justice and faith. 
I will do so by suggesting an interpretive lens 
through which we may best understand the 
driving forces behind modern secularism – a lens 
that Taylor develops in his earlier work. According 
to the author, secularity is not the gradual and 
inevitable eclipse of religion by the forces of 
science and instrumental rationality. Rather, it is 
the result of modern shifts in our moral 
imagination: how we envision ourselves, our 
world, and the good life. Stated plainly: our secular 
age is one in which it is possible to imagine and 
pursue human flourishing in ways that require no 
reference to the transcendent. This becomes clear 
when we read A Secular Age through Taylor’s 
earlier texts, particularly Sources of the Self.9 Such a 
perspective places the ethical at the center of 
today’s theological enterprise, and presents unique 
challenges and opportunities for those engaged in 
peace and justice education at Jesuit colleges and 
universities. After sketching the framework of 
moral identity that Taylor develops in Sources of the 
Self, I hope to offer insights for how educators, 
particularly through service-learning, can inform 
and assist students as they negotiate authentic 
expressions of their identity and beliefs. 
 
Mapping Our Moral Identities:  
Life Goods, Hypergoods, and Constitutive 
Goods 
The task that Taylor assigns himself in Sources of the 
Self is immense. In this work he seeks to discern 
and trace the emergence of the modern self: how 
we have come to understand and locate ourselves 
in the world in the particular ways that we do 
today. Our identity as modern individuals, our 
radical reflexivity, and our individualized quest to 
make meaning of our lives is a unique 
phenomenon in western history. While there are 
many facets contributing to this vision of self, 
Taylor advances a primarily moral framework 
sustaining our sense of identity. The modern 
“sources of the self” are more ethical than 
ontological.  
Taylor’s conviction is that our identity and how 
we envision the world are inescapably linked to 
our values and our conception of the good. Taylor 
grounds his proposal in our common experience 
of what he terms “strong evaluations” of “life 
goods”, which “involve discriminations of right or 
wrong, better or worse, higher or lower, which are 
not rendered valid by our own desires, 
inclinations, or choices, but rather stand 
independent of these and offer standards by 
which they can be judged.”10 Within his definition 
of these strong evaluations are several important 
components that contribute to his notion of the 
self, and ultimately, of secularization. First, it is 
necessary to recognize that not all choices are 
genuine strong evaluations. Our preferences for 
musical acts or ice cream flavors are exactly that: 
preferences. While we may feel passionately about 
these opinions, we nevertheless recognize them as 
such. We do not hold others accountable for 
failing to share our tastes in such matters 
regardless of how much we may disagree.  
Strong evaluations, on the other hand, are those 
moral intuitions that are perceived to have 
grounding in external or objective criteria. They 
are recognitions of goods that are beyond us and 
that attract us to them. More than the questions of 
duty and transgression that typically fall under the 
auspices of morality, these are judgments about 
what it is that makes life meaningful or fulfilling: 
our families, careers, and passions. In many of our 
more foundational choices, we do indeed believe 
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that some values or ways of being are superior to 
others. We view particular ways of living or acting 
in the world as more praiseworthy than others. 
Similarly, our disagreement with the choices of 
others extends beyond opinion and preference. 
This disapproval is not limited to situations of 
oppression or injustice. One may live a quiet and 
solitary life in which she has done no real harm to 
others or transgressed any serious moral 
injunction; yet, to declare her life meaningless is to 
hold her accountable to a standard beyond 
personal preference (and to issue a particularly 
grave condemnation in our contemporary age). 
Thus, these evaluations have both a descriptive 
and prescriptive role. We evaluate objects and 
actions as we perceive them, but also discern what 
goods are worthy of pursuit.  
According to Taylor, we make such evaluations on 
a regular basis, both about others and ourselves. 
Often, however, the roots or foundations of these 
judgments remain largely unarticulated. We 
experience them as moral instincts or gut 
reactions. Our moral sensibilities are outraged 
when we witness blatant acts of oppression or 
neglect, and likewise we experience a sense of 
wonder and humble awe when witnessing a life of 
heroic virtue. For naturalists and sociobiologists, 
common adversaries in Taylor’s writings, the 
seemingly instinctual response is evidence of 
irrational subjectivism with no ontological basis. 
Our articulated justifications for these judgments 
are considered, “so much froth, nonsense from a 
bygone age.”11 Ironically, this refusal to 
acknowledge the ontological becomes an ontology 
of its own for the naturalist, but this is getting 
ahead of the story.  
When we articulate our selfhood, it is these life 
goods that give us our sense of the values and 
priorities that make us who we are. We map our 
identity in terms of where we stand relative to 
those objects we treasure. Our significant 
relationships, creative self-expression, and 
participation in meaningful projects give us a 
sense of moral location, and we would be lost 
without these landmarks. Such strong evaluations 
compose the moral frameworks that give meaning 
to our lives and endeavors. Far from static, these 
judgments fluctuate in both content and 
significance. Moreover, we perceive ourselves as 
growing closer to or farther from particular goods 
over the course of our lifetime. As we strive 
toward these sources of meaning, we are also 
aware that we risk failing in our endeavor.12 
When forced to explain or justify our moral 
judgments, or when we encounter a conflict of 
goods in our lived experience, we draw on deeper 
values and higher orders of worth. Behind our 
appraisals of particular actions and modes of 
being, there are more foundational goods that 
order strong evaluations and establish a hierarchy 
of commitments. Our appreciation for countless 
particular goods coalesces around ideals such as 
justice, honor, or self-expression. “Hypergoods” 
such as these provide the vantage point from 
which life goods are “weighed, judged, decided 
about.”13 When we formulate an articulation of 
the good life, our starting point is these 
hypergoods. Similarly, societal debates and culture 
wars frequently occur along the fault lines of 
competing hypergoods, and hence competing 
moralities. Even when there is an agreement about 
some set of goods, their proper ordering can be 
source of division (honoring patriotism versus 
universal human rights, for example).  
Taylor believes that societies can reject and 
transcend inadequate hypergoods, as evidenced by 
Plato’s assault on Greek warrior ethic, but 
remnants will nevertheless remain. In a pluralistic 
society such as ours, we must not only account for 
the fragments of past ethical systems, but must 
also negotiate the multiple living traditions that 
remain active and vibrant. Such deliberations are 
not accomplished through abstraction, but by 
directly appealing to the moral intuitions of 
agents. Echoing Alasdair MacIntyre, moral 
deliberation about the proper ordering of 
hypergoods occurs in conversations among rival 
traditions.14 An interlocutor must demonstrate 
why attachment to one particular set of goods 
over another facilitates a more meaningful human 
life: “You will only convince me by changing my 
reading of my moral experience, and in particular 
my reading of my life story, of the transitions I 
have lived through – or perhaps refused to live 
through.”15 Systematic abstraction and universal 
declarations may be appealing, but they are a 
distortion of the actual ways that individuals 
engage in practical reasoning. Conversion begins 
with learning to retell our stories. 
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Naming the goods that motivate our lives is a 
central concern for Taylor. Without such 
articulation, life remains unexamined; moral 
conversations and deliberations are impossible. 
When one must give further account of even these 
hypergoods that inform our vision of a 
meaningful life, we will in turn articulate their 
ultimate source: our “constitutive good.”16 This is 
more than yet another layer of evaluations; rather, 
it is the source of all life goods, and the font of 
goodness itself. Plato’s ideal of the Good is a 
helpful point of departure for investigating 
Taylor’s scheme.17 Wisdom, for Plato, is rooted in 
a vision of and love for the rational ordering of 
the cosmos. In other words, the Good for Plato 
has both a moral and an ontological dimension; it 
is a perception of how things are and an affective 
desiring for that reality. The Good is 
“constitutive,” to use Taylor’s vocabulary, because 
it is the source for all subsequent goods and 
values, and for reality itself. Further, it is love for 
this Good that empowers us to act morally in the 
world. The Good, for Plato, is both the source 
and the goal of the moral life. 
Taylor does not pigeonhole all other traditions 
into Plato’s framework, but he does perceive a 
similar dynamic at work in other mature moral 
theories. In each, there is a strong relationship 
between the world as such and the goods that 
ought to be pursued. Thus, for example, even 
materialistic Marxists proclaim an ontology that 
envisions history as an inevitable progression 
toward liberation. So too, secular ecologists today 
have their own perception of the world and our 
proper place in it. For Christians, particularly as 
inheritors of Augustine’s Platonism, God is the 
constitutive good. God is the source of the 
rational ordering of the cosmos – the way things 
are. Similarly, through prayer and closer affiliation 
with the divine, we are empowered to act morally 
within this cosmos, thus bringing us closer to 
God’s reign. The constitutive good, therefore, is a 
closed circle, defining our comprehension of 
reality and our vision of the telos. Through 
modernity, it is not so much that this general 
moral framework has changed, but rather its 
content has. The life goods and constitutive goods 
that we define and value are now secular and 
immanent. 
 
Before exploring this evolution, however, it is 
necessary to consider Taylor’s link between the 
good and identity in greater detail. Who we are 
and what we value are entirely intertwined in 
Taylor’s work, so much so that he never treats one 
without addressing the other. Thus the 
progression presented here is artificial, though 
nevertheless helpful in understanding Taylor’s 
project. Identity begins with the strong evaluations 
that we make. This needs no elaborate defense, 
but should rather be readily apparent. When asked 
to describe ourselves or give an account of our 
lives, we necessarily make judgments about what 
merit mentioning and what does not. We decide 
which relationships and activities are more central 
to our self-understanding and which are 
peripheral. It is who we are as a mother, artist, or 
citizen that shapes the core of our character. 
These roles are not merely descriptive, but value-
laden. 
This link between the good and identity continues 
through Taylor’s hypergoods. Even beyond our 
judgments and the roles that we play, our 
uniqueness is rooted in the overarching goods that 
order our lives: belief in concepts such as fidelity 
or service. Ultimately, our identities are grounded 
in our constitutive good. The source of our 
strength and goal of our efforts is the defining 
characteristic of our identity. These are not static 
realities, however. As we have already seen, our 
ordering and judgments about the good can 
change over time. What was once the overriding 
goal of our lives can be exposed as a false idol or 
simply decline when we are drawn to higher 
values. Our roles change and different aspects of 
our identity come to the fore. 
Critically for Taylor, as self-interpreting animals 
our identity is evaluated in terms of how we 
measure against the goods that we value. Whether 
we believe ourselves to be moral or not, these 
hypergoods and the constitutive good provide the 
dimensions for our self-evaluation. We define our 
existence not merely by what we value, but by the 
degree to which we are approaching or regressing 
from these ideals. The narrative of our lives is the 
journey toward or away from our ultimate values. 
Our self-worth is rooted in our evaluation of how 
we are doing: 
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Whereas I naturally want to be well 
placed in relation to all and any of the 
goods I recognize and to be moving 
towards rather than away from them, my 
direction in relation to this good has a 
crucial importance. Just because my 
orientation to it is essential to my identity, 
so the recognition that my life is turned 
away from it, or can never approach it, 
would be devastating and insufferable… 
Symmetrically, the assurance that I am 
turned towards this good gives me a sense 
of wholeness, of fulness [sic] of being as a 
person or self, that nothing else can.18 
This centrality of self-interpretation puts Taylor at 
odds with deterministic theories that explain 
behavior with no reference to identity.19 It is not 
simply the cultural or economic context in which 
we find ourselves that shapes our self-
understanding. Rather, it is how we articulate the 
narrative of our striving. Yet, this self-
interpretation should not be confused with 
absolute autonomy. We seek to make meaning out 
of the stories of our lives, but the tools with which 
we work are largely provided by our historical and 
cultural context. When Taylor speaks of the moral 
frameworks or horizons (he uses the two 
interchangeably) that shape our identity, he 
recognizes that we are never more than co-authors 
of these structures: “People may see their identity 
as defined partly by some moral or spiritual 
commitment, say as a Catholic, or an anarchist… 
What they are saying by this is not just that they 
are strongly attached to this spiritual view or 
background; rather it is that this provides the 
frame within which they can determine where they 
stand on questions of what is good, or 
worthwhile, or admirable, or of value.”20  
Taylor describes these frameworks as inescapable, 
with two implications. First, he holds that it is 
impossible to ever step out of a framework 
completely. While one set of goods may give way 
to another, escaping the dynamic itself is 
impossible. To do so would be to abandon 
precisely what makes us human (i.e., self-
interpreting animals).21 To be without a 
framework is to suffer a crisis of identity, to lose 
one’s location in the world. Yet, these frames are 
likewise inescapable in the sense that they are 
constantly being handed on and formed by our 
larger social network and culture. Who we are 
begins with what narratives and practices have 
shaped our values. As Ruth Abbey observes, 
“When all the features of an individual’s self-
interpretation are aggregated this might amount to 
something unique, but this interpretation always 
points beyond the individual to the wider society 
and culture to which she belongs. This is because 
the array of linguistic, intellectual, emotional, and 
aesthetic resources available for interpreting 
oneself are furnished by one’s culture.”22 We can 
only make do with the tools and resources we 
have been given, though they may be limited and 
fallible. Our culture may both guide and deceive 
us. Though we can critically engage these sources, 
we only do so from a rival perspective. 
Identity, Belief, and Fullness in a Secular Age 
Taylor’s account of our secular age is rooted in the 
gradual shifting of the moral frameworks and 
social imaginaries that constitute our sense of self 
and world. In Sources of the Self, Taylor identifies 
three shifts in our moral imagination that 
profoundly influence the modern understanding 
of the self. The first is a growing appreciation for 
the inner depths of self: the Cartesian mind 
disengages from an embodied existence and later, 
with wonder and awe, we begin to perceive the 
limitless and mysterious abyss within each one of 
us. Plumbing and expressing these inner depths 
becomes a modern moral imperative. Second, and 
largely through the contributions of the 
Reformation, our modern period has witnessed 
the abolition of higher and lower callings in life. 
Ordinary life and the focus on daily routines of 
production and reproduction emerge as moral 
ideal. It is no longer what we do that matters, but 
the spirit with which we do it. Or, as the Puritans 
aptly summarize, “God loveth adverbs.” The third 
modern shift is toward nature as a moral source. 
We find empowerment by accessing the forces of 
nature in the world and ourselves. Yet by this 
time, nature (both externally and within) becomes 
viewed as entirely disenchanted and mechanistic, a 
closed system with no ongoing contact with the 
divine.  
Over time, our modern sense of self was formed 
through the allure, challenge, and reactions against 
these new moral sources. It is not difficult to 
perceive the influence this new understanding of 
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inner depths, ordinary life, and nature has had on 
our moral identities. They remain central to our 
articulations of the good life. We can also begin to 
recognize the effects this moral vision has had on 
our sense of the transcendent. This is a vision of 
human flourishing that has little need of, and little 
room for, a personal God.  
Shifting our attention to A Secular Age, Taylor 
synthesizes and expands this moral framework as 
he develops his notion of fullness, an idea that he 
introduces in the following way: 
Somewhere, in some activity, or 
condition, lies a fullness, a richness; that 
is, in that place… life is fuller, richer, 
deeper, more worth while, more 
admirable, more what it should be. This is 
perhaps a place of power: we often 
experience this as deeply moving, as 
inspiring. Perhaps this sense of fullness is 
something we just catch glimpses of from 
afar off; we have the powerful intuition of 
what fullness would be, were we to be in 
that condition… of peace or wholeness; 
or able to act on that level, of integrity or 
generosity or abandonment or self-
forgetfulness.23 
Like Taylor’s concept of constitutive goods, these 
moments of fullness orient our identity. We 
understand ourselves in terms of how we relate to 
them, even if they are only imagined or 
experienced as an absence or loss of something we 
once knew. Our daily routines find a deeper 
meaning when we believe that we are slowly 
progressing toward some vision of flourishing.  
This notion of fullness largely encapsulates how 
Taylor frames his notion of constitutive goods in 
Sources of the Self. There is a similar dynamic of 
something beyond us both drawing us in and 
sending us forward. It is not only a moment of 
heightened awareness, but an ideal around which 
we structure our lives. When we are removed or 
withdrawing away from this good, we know that 
something is amiss. In the Christian tradition, 
whose constitutive good is God, genuine fullness, 
the ultimate telos of human life, is always beyond 
our temporal lives and finite possibilities. Indeed, 
it may even demand that we sacrifice a degree of 
flourishing on Earth, a proposal that strikes the 
secular humanist as anti-human and self-
destructive. This sense of a transcendent fullness 
forms a bare, pragmatic definition of religion for 
Taylor, at least within western civilization.24 
Because Taylor is not concerned with institutional 
religion in the public sphere or as a set of 
practices, this “cowardly” definition of religion 
allows Taylor to hone in on the crux of disbelief in 
our contemporary society. 
Defining religion as a vision of fullness found in 
the transcendent establishes a series of binaries by 
which Taylor outlines the contours of 
contemporary secularism. Against the 
transcendent, the secularist embraces a notion of 
fullness that is grounded entirely within the 
immanent. In a similar manner, Taylor draws a 
distinction between finding one’s moral source 
from within or without.25 As he identified in 
Sources of the Self, Taylor holds that the modern 
identity finds wonder and mystery within his or 
her own depths of self. Our moral strength and 
direction comes from our inner hidden nature. As 
it became increasingly possible to envision 
flourishing with no referent to transcendent 
realities, theistic belief became superfluous and 
optional. Hence Taylor’s thesis: 
I would like to claim that the coming of 
modern secularity in my sense has been 
coterminous with the rise of a society in 
which for the first time in history a purely 
self-sufficient humanism came to be a 
widely available option. I mean by this a 
humanism accepting no final goals 
beyond human flourishing, nor any 
allegiance to anything else beyond this 
flourishing. Of no previous society was 
this true.26 
 The story of secularism is the story of the 
emergence of an entirely immanent vision of 
human flourishing. The great irony that Taylor 
identifies is the degree to which this shift was 
driven by Christian motivations.  
Taylor explores many of the attempts to navigate 
this new pluralistic arena, particularly from 
positions of unbelief. Once again, to consider each 
of these channels is beyond the scope of this 
paper. A few general insights, however, set the 
stage for considering the implications of and 
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response to Taylor’s project from the perspective 
of Jesuit higher education. As previously 
mentioned, Taylor resists any secularism narrative 
in which science gradually disproves religious 
superstition. The naturalist position requires 
unfounded presuppositions of their own, and any 
functional life must include some leaps of faith. 
Further, it is possible to abandon certain images of 
God that have proven unreliable without 
jettisoning faith all together. Taylor believes that 
significant experiences and phenomena have the 
capacity to be spun in either direction. Those who 
believe will find evidence for their belief, while 
those who resist find ample proof of their own 
position. Our secular age is not a story of 
subtraction, and renewed belief will not be the 
product of intellectual proofs and deductive 
reasoning alone. 
Still, Taylor presses his case further. While he does 
not offer a substantive apologetic for theistic 
belief, he does raise several questions concerning 
the limits of exclusive humanism. Our times and 
context have produced several cross-pressures and 
dilemmas. Taylor openly wonders whether a 
closed moral framework provides sufficient depth 
of meaning to navigate our contemporary 
situation. When we encounter new life, death, 
suffering, or any number of other momentous 
events, does exclusive humanism have the spiritual 
resources necessary to help us discern meaning? 
Does it have the moral depth we need to sustain 
the life of benevolence we moderns prize? Our 
need for meaning and moral orientation has not 
abated, but the resources at hand have dwindled. 
Taylor affirms, “The issue about meaning is a 
central preoccupation of our age, and its 
threatened lack fragilizes all the narratives of 
modernity by which we live.”27 
This is where the work of Jesuit education 
rightfully begins. The drive for meaning remains, 
and in many ways has intensified in modern times. 
The great luxury of living in an enchanted age is 
that meaning was provided for you; it was woven 
into the fabric of the cosmos. Now, not only are 
there several fragmented systems of meaning from 
which to choose, each individual is expected to 
piece together and express an entirely unique self. 
We draw on the social imaginaries that surround 
us, but are forbidden from admitting any authority 
beyond our internal intuition. Not even theistic 
believers are free from these tensions.  
Taylor summarizes many of these insights in The 
Ethics of Authenticity, declaring that authenticity has 
become for westerners the ultimate good and 
virtue – the hypergood of contemporary western 
society.28 This much, to Taylor, is unavoidable. 
Yet, against the “booster” and “knocker” arguing 
over the proper place of authenticity in society, 
Taylor suggests that the more fruitful discussion 
concerns what type of authenticity we seek: 
What we ought to be doing is fighting 
over the meaning of authenticity, and 
from the standpoint developed here, we 
ought to be trying to persuade people that 
self-fulfilment [sic], so far from excluding 
unconditional relationships and moral 
demands beyond the self, actually requires 
these in some form. The struggle ought 
not be over authenticity, for or against, but 
about it, defining its proper meaning. We 
ought to be trying to lift the culture back 
up, closer to its motivating ideal.29 
The search for authentic fullness is a common 
struggle across contemporary moral frameworks. 
Jesuit education has the opportunity to meet 
people in this quest and help them to develop a 
vocabulary that reinterprets their lives in more 
meaningful ways.30 Regardless of religious 
affiliation, there is merit in challenging anyone to 
be more articulate about the goods that shape 
their identity. Indeed, Taylor’s Sources of the Self 
offers a blueprint for engaging others on not just 
faith, but broader questions of how we imagine 
human flourishing. Rather than a broadside 
inquiry into one’s constitutive good, the 
conversation can begin around any number of 
strong evaluations. For Taylor it is these strong 
evaluations begin to form our identity by 
distinguishing those elements that are of greater 
importance. Conversations around life goods can 
in turn lead to deeper sharing about the 
hypergoods and constitutive good of one’s life. 
Jesuit education could begin not with a broadside 
attack on science and secularism, but by simply 
inquiring what it is that another values and desires. 
Taylor concludes A Secular Age by speculating how 
one can break free from the immanent frame and 
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open his or her horizon to the transcendent. To 
Taylor, this amounts to a conversion in the 
deepest sense of the term. He highlights several 
individuals who discovered something beyond the 
immanent frame; or more accurately, were pulled 
from it. This suggests that in the end, the work is 
beyond human efforts. Nevertheless, there is a 
clear path forward for engaging believers and 
unbelievers alike. It would be impossible to revert 
to earlier times, and Taylor refuses to discount the 
good that modernity has brought forth. The 
critical question is not how to escape or overcome 
our secular age, but rather, how to cultivate 
meaningful lives within it. This is a task that we all 
share. Our success or failure will largely depend 
on how we understand and frame the issue. 
Secularism is not merely a question about what 
exists, but what we value; and what we value 
determines who we are. We must engage in 
sincere conversations about how we imagine 
authentic flourishing and how it is realized in our 
lives. 
Fostering Magnanimity and a Ruined Life 
It is here that I believe the sociologist Christian 
Smith, most famous for identifying the de facto 
faith of contemporary adolescents as Moralistic 
Therapeutic Deism, becomes an interesting 
conversation partner with Taylor. Smith’s book 
Lost in Transition identifies key challenges facing 
college-aged emerging adults today.31 The first and 
apparently fundamental problem in Smith’s 
perspective is the moral drift, confusion, and 
inarticulacy that he and his collaborators identified 
in their interviews. When challenged to describe a 
situation that required a difficult discernment of 
right or wrong, or to articulate their moral code, 
most participants were unable to provide any clear 
response. Moreover, though they affirmed that 
some actions and behaviors are always wrong, 
participants could not identify what it was that 
made them so. The emerging adults that Smith 
interviewed struggled to name their sources of 
morality, relying instead on trust in their moral 
intuitions and gut reactions. 
What Smith sees as a foundational challenge for 
emerging adults is not such a dire situation from 
Taylor’s perspective. For Taylor, it is natural for 
our moral evaluations and frameworks to exist in 
an inarticulate and unreflective way. Most young 
adults dwell within social worlds in which these 
basic assumptions are seldom challenged or 
engaged; an insight that developmental 
psychologists have recognized for decades. While 
they do not have the readily accessible 
propositions that a catechism once provided, it is 
unlikely that early twenty-year-olds were ever able 
to articulate the sort of moral sophistication Smith 
seems to expect.  
A far more compelling portrayal of the 
contemporary obstacles to belief (at least from 
Taylor’s perspective) appears in Smith’s following 
discussion on consumerism. Though it was not his 
primary concern, the questions that are asked in 
this chapter are quite revealing through the lens of 
identity and the good. In interviews, Smith and 
colleagues ask participants to describe the goals 
and aspirations toward which they strive: what 
they picture as the good life. What is surprising 
about most responses is their banality. Few 
participants offered any desires beyond a 
comfortable existence: “A family, a nice car, nice 
house, my own practice, be happy, stuff like 
that.”32 The exceptional few hope for extravagant 
wealth or fame, but most are content with simply 
enough to comfortably survive and provide for 
loved ones. What their responses lacked was any 
vision of a larger purpose to existence. In both the 
social and spiritual realms, participants could not 
imagine a vision of fullness or flourishing beyond 
unproblematic subsistence. Nor were there any 
great causes for which it was worth sacrificing 
their own well-being.  
This places any discussion of moral and spiritual 
belief in a new light. Regardless of what 
theological convictions emerging adults profess, 
the truth is that most imagine a life in which little 
is asked of God, and little is required in return – a 
sort of functional secularism. The visions of the 
good life that animate our students are greatly 
impoverished. It is not simply that they are failing 
to envisage the fullness of the reign of God; their 
imaginations do not extend beyond their own 
domestic tranquility. We are witnessing, to use 
Taylor’s categories, the triumph of ordinary life.  
Nevertheless, emerging adults have not lost their 
esteem for universal compassion and human 
rights. Their social media timelines are filled with 
articles, videos, and petitions rallying for or against 
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any number of pressing social concerns. Indeed, 
their rejection of organized religion is often 
articulated in opposition to what they perceive as 
hypocrisy and intolerance rampant within the 
institution. Yet most prefer that their social 
engagement remain at a safe distance – never 
willing to risk too much to realize their ideals. The 
degree to which “slacktivism” should be 
celebrated or lamented remains an active debate, 
and cannot be resolved here. But the trend itself is 
very telling. We want to see the end of violence 
and poverty but don’t want it to get in the way of 
us enjoying a night out with friends now and a 
secure life in the future.  
This tension between functional secularism and 
limitless social concern provides a unique lens 
through which to view justice education at Jesuit 
colleges and universities. Most often, moral 
commitments are treated as secondary to 
ontological claims. It is assumed that only after 
theoretical principles are established can we begin 
to discuss their practical consequences. Yet 
Taylor’s insights suggest just the reverse. It is our 
moral experiences – our struggles to articulate and 
realize our moral ideals – that lead us to 
investigate deeper ontological beliefs. Establishing 
the theoretical possibility or likelihood of a 
personal deity does little to engage the more 
fundamental questions of selfhood. As long as 
students comfortably remain in the functional 
secularism that Christian Smith seems to identify, 
in which human flourishing requires no contact 
with the transcendent, any investigation into the 
content of faith will remain an abstract curiosity 
with little impact on one’s lived identity. What can 
educating for justice offer in such a situation? 
In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle offers a brief 
discussion on the virtue of magnanimity – 
greatness of soul.33 Aquinas subsequently develops 
this virtue through a Christian lens.34 Magnanimity 
provides an apt description of what is missing in 
the moral imagination of many today: the belief 
that one is capable and worthy of great things. 
Education for justice at its best does not rely 
solely on outrage at suffering or cold calculations 
of fairness; rather it enlivens one’s sense of worth 
and potential. It presents a vision of human 
flourishing that is open to experiences of both 
community and transcendence. It engages and 
forces us to articulate (in Taylor’s categories) the 
strong evaluations and constitutive goods that 
form our identity. By studying the lives of moral 
exemplars, students examine their own 
commitments and the sources that sustain them. 
Experiential service-learning programs pull us out 
of our daily routines and offer a glimpse of human 
fullness that goes beyond quiet productivity and 
consumption. Without indoctrination, educating 
for justice has the potential to break through our 
individualistic and secular frames.35 
I would like to offer an example from my past 
work with the Jesuit Volunteer Corps. Decades 
ago, Jack Morris, the Jesuit frequently credited 
with founding the organization, would throw his 
hands up in mock disgust whenever he would 
learn of a volunteer abandoning past aspirations 
for a successful corporate career so that she could 
dedicate herself to serving her neighbor. “Ah!” he 
would lament, “another one, ruined for life!” This 
phrase soon captured the imaginations of others 
engaged in the work and became JVC’s unofficial 
motto. Still today, potential volunteers are drawn 
by this sense of becoming ruined – the uneasy 
awareness that there is more to life than what we 
are usually promised. It has become its own vision 
of fullness.  
Yet it is only after months of struggling to realize 
the ideals expressed in JVC’s four values of 
community, spirituality, simplicity, and justice that 
volunteers begin to acknowledge that their own 
efforts are not enough to sustain their work; that 
they need to engage some moral and spiritual 
source beyond themselves. For some this means a 
return to the traditions and devotions of their 
youth, while others seek new paths and practices 
that better fit their values and needs. Theistic 
belief has never been a requirement for Jesuit 
volunteers, just the willingness to explore and 
question. Proselytism has never been the goal, 
though a sort of conversion inevitably occurs. The 
experience of striving to realize our highest ideals 
and aspirations, and repeatedly falling short, forces 
us to acknowledge and engage our moral sources 
in a way that theoretical conversation alone never 
could. 
This is the power and promise of service-learning 
and educating for justice. The Catholic social 
tradition carries with it a vision of the person in 
society and in creation that resonates with even 
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the most closed and secular modern frameworks. 
In so doing, it invites students to recognize and 
name their own vision of fullness – as well as the 
moral sources that animate and sustain it. It 
fosters a greatness of soul – the belief that we are 
capable and worthy of more in life. Between 
learning about the tradition and being formed in 
the identity (between docere and tradere), there is a 
host of ways in which students can learn from the 
church’s social tradition and articulate their own 
vision of fullness in conversation with it. 
Educating a Justice That Does Faith 
How, specifically, might Taylor’s insights inform 
justice education on Jesuit campuses? To return to 
the moral framework that he articulates in Sources 
of the Self, it begins with engaging the life goods 
and strong evaluations to which our students are 
already committed. While they may profess a 
staunch relativism, they make decisions each day 
about what constitutes a meaningful and 
flourishing human life. Indeed even this relativism 
is rooted in moral ideals of tolerance, diversity, 
and authenticity. One need not immediately 
launch into an investigation of students’ religious 
identity or faith commitments. Rather, following 
Ignatius’s maxim of entering through their door, 
we might begin to engage students by simply 
inquiring where their passions lie, and what 
aspects of their life constitute their sense of self. 
This may be as simple as their extracurricular 
activities or the social and political issues about 
which they are concerned. It is often these simple 
conversations that expand to the most profound 
ones. From basic life goods the dialogue might 
eventually expand to how a student manages 
conflicts between goals and commitments or 
prioritizes life goals.  
Deepening conversations may aim toward the 
hypergoods that orient a student’s sense of self: 
how do they weigh the multiple demands on their 
time and energy? What priorities do they want to 
cultivate during their studies and beyond? 
Students often need help in naming and 
articulating these foundational ideals, yet are 
relieved to at least have these tensions 
acknowledged. Once they are named, the 
conversation can turn toward what it takes to 
sustain their higher values over a lifetime. This 
might include a community of support and 
practices of renewal that empower the student to 
continue the journey. While the conversation may 
never lead to committed religious faith, it does tap 
into the student’s deepest moral and spiritual 
sources. Of course, a conversation like this takes 
time and develops slowly (if at all).  
There are many ways that service-learning and 
experiential education can aid this process. It is 
often far too easy for students to remain 
comfortably in familiar surroundings (the 
infamous “campus bubble”) and never test their 
moral commitments and buffered selves. Lighting 
the spark of magnanimity often requires a direct 
and personal encounter. Concerns about the 
merits of short-term volunteer and immersion 
experiences are nothing new. In 1968 Ivan Illich 
proclaimed “to hell with good intentions” and 
implored would-be volunteers to opt out of 
“mission-vacations” that could only do more 
harm than good.36 Whether immersion programs 
are worth the resources they require remains an 
active debate.37 There is also a growing body of 
literature questioning traditional models of 
service-learning courses and highlighting the ways 
in which student volunteers can be a greater 
burden than benefit to local nonprofit agencies.38 
As a mechanism for delivering newly painted walls 
to impoverished populations, short-term 
volunteering is indeed inefficient at best. Yet there 
remains no comparable way to offer students 
glimpses of a fullness that surpasses their moral 
imagination. It is this fullness rooted in solidarity 
that invites students to more deeply reflect on 
their own goals and narratives. 
What students are to do with the highs that they 
experience through these encounters is not always 
thoughtfully developed. While we promise 
ourselves that we will never forget those we 
encounter and the lessons we learn, we inevitably 
do. Often, students resolve to replicate the 
experience by taking more trips or seeking even 
more extreme frontiers. A more promising avenue 
is trying to translate these heightened experiences 
into sustained moral commitments – work that is 
exceedingly more difficult. This is where a justice 
that does faith takes root. 
As a hypothetical, it is easy to believe that we can 
sustain and act upon our moral commitments; and 
we indeed may – for a while. Yet the full weight of 
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our moral ideals is only realized when we begin to 
experience the struggles, setbacks, and failures that 
accompany any march toward justice. A week-
long immersion experience rarely leaves us ruined 
for life, no matter how much we may feel it at the 
time. Even semester-long service-learning courses 
are not always enough to challenge students to tap 
into their moral and spiritual reserves. I have 
taught courses in which school breaks and snow 
days piled up to the point that students begin 
saying goodbye before they ever truly felt settled. 
While I do not deny the benefits of these courses, 
I am convinced that engaging the deeper roots of 
a student’s identity takes more time than we are 
usually allowed. 
Over the past two years I have had the good 
fortune to teach sections of Boston College’s 
PULSE: Person and Social Responsibility. In this 
year-long, twelve credit hour course, students 
satisfy their core philosophical and theological 
requirements while volunteering ten to twelve 
hours per week with a local nonprofit agency. This 
program remains the finest example that I have 
encountered in practice or literature. The high 
demand that it places on students is essential to its 
success (and, it is worth noting, only seems to add 
to its appeal). Within the first few days of fall 
semester I warn my students that there will 
inevitably come a time in which it will get tough 
and they’ll be ready to quit. Yet, it is usually not 
until February or March that this dire prediction 
comes to pass. Only after their friends have lost all 
interest in their service, a New England winter has 
knocked out public transportation, and they 
realize that their best efforts have made almost no 
difference in the lives of those they serve do 
students begin to ask if they truly have what it 
takes to remain committed to their lofty ideals. 
It is at this moment that two deeply interrelated 
conversations can begin in earnest. The first 
concerns the social and spiritual resources that 
empower them in their work: when do they feel 
burnout and how do they respond? How do they 
renew themselves to continue in the struggle? Is 
there a community from which they draw 
support? The second conversations looks ahead, 
inviting vocational discernment about how the 
needs and struggles they witness intersect with 
their own passions, talents, and goals. It has been 
my experience that feelings of accomplishment are 
inversely related to the amount of time spent in 
service. It is easy to congratulate ourselves for a 
week of intensive service. The longer students 
struggle and fail to make a difference at their 
partnering agencies, the more deeply the realize 
that a commitment to justice will require their 
entire lives.  
If, as they soon discover, a year of service does 
not save the world, what will? It is easy to slip into 
despair at these moments, but there is an 
alternative. From Taylor’s perspective, we make 
meaning of our lives through the stories we tell 
about the goods and Good toward which we 
strive. Purely speculative reasoning about the good 
life or the existence of a good God may help to 
sharpen our arguments, but it rarely taps into 
these core narratives. Yet once an authentic 
encounter with the Other activates these values, 
students soon recognize that their entire lives are 
at stake. For Taylor, the question of identity is one 
of orientation, not arrival. Fullness is only 
experienced in glimpses, and reassurance is found 
not in the knowledge that we have accomplished 
our goal, but simply that we are on a meaningful 
path. As students reimagine themselves as women 
and men who walk and struggle in solidarity, 
success is defined by simply remaining on the 
path. On a journey so perilous, we soon discover 
that we cannot walk alone. 
Conclusion 
This perspective and dynamic casts the link 
between the service of faith and the promotion of 
justice in a new light. Forty years ago, the 32nd 
General Congregation challenged all of us to 
recognize the demands of justice that are implicit 
in our faith commitments. Increasingly today the 
direction has shifted. Justice, not faith, is the 
natural point of departure. Our students continue 
to negotiate their identities in conversation with 
those goods that they find valuable and 
worthwhile. These include the values of universal 
solidarity and human dignity that are essential to 
our modern moral order. Yet sustained action on 
these ideals is impossible without drawing upon 
our deeper moral and spiritual resources.  
Our students will only realize this for themselves 
when they are given the opportunities to put their 
social principles into action. As long as our moral 
Daniel P. Justin: Educating for Justice in a Secular Age 
Jesuit Higher Education 5(1): 21-33 (2016) 32 
debates take place within the safe confines of the 
classroom or message board, they will never 
engage one’s deeper sources of meaning and 
value. Justice and peace education is not a 
secondary theological activity. It is not up to the 
scripture scholars and systematicians to articulate a 
theological vision that justice educators translate 
in concrete social contexts and political actions. 
Rather, it is by struggling to find the words to 
make sense of our experiences of fullness that we 
are compelled to engage our theological traditions. 
If we have no sense of this fullness, we will have 
little need of theological language. 
It is likely a revelation to very few that theological 
education today, particularly justice and peace 
education, does more than teach moral principles 
and intellectual speculation. More frequently, it 
invites students to bring concrete experiences into 
conversation with their own values and moral 
traditions – to engage in the work of practical 
theology. Learning to articulate and investigate our 
moral ideals in conversation with concrete social 
realities serves an essential dimension of every 
human life. Still today in our secular age, these 
questions of meaning and identity remain 
inescapable – even when our vision of fullness 
begins to look a lot like a ruined life. 
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